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ABSTRACT
We formulate and study the algorithmic mechanism design
problem for a general class of resource allocation settings,
where the center redistributes the private resources brought
by individuals. Money transfer is forbidden. Distinct from
the standard literature, which assumes the amount of re-
sources brought by an individual to be public information,
we consider this amount as an agent’s private, possibly multi-
dimensional type. Our goal is to design truthful mechanisms
that achieve two objectives: maxmin and Pareto efficiency.
For each objective, we provide a reduction that converts
any optimal algorithm into a strategy-proof mechanism that
achieves the same objective. Our reductions do not inspect
the input algorithms but only query these algorithms as or-
acles.
Applying the reductions, we produce strategy-proof mech-
anisms in a non-trivial application: network route alloca-
tion. Our models and result in the application are valuable
on their own rights.
Keywords
mechanism design, strategyproof, resource allocation, net-
work routing
1. INTRODUCTION
One of the most important problems at the intersection
of economics and computation is algorithmic mechanism de-
sign, which dates back to the seminal work of Nisan and
Ronen [20]. The basic problem asks:
Given an algorithmic optimization problem, is it possible
to efficiently produce a truthful mechanism that (approxi-
mately) achieves the optimal value of the original problem?
Over the past decade, there has been a number of break-
throughs regarding this problem in settings where money
transfer is allowed, including the rich literature on truth-
ful welfare-maximizing mechanism design [22, 9, 8], and
Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) mechanism design [14].
Recently, the same problem has been investigated under the
context of revenue optimal mechanism design [6, 7].
Distinct from the above literature, we study algorithmic
mechanism design without money [21, Chapter 10]. In par-
ticular, we study a general class of resource allocation prob-
lems, where each agent brings a certain amount of resources
and the mechanism distributes these resources to achieve
certain objectives. It is important to note that our setting
differs from the standard resource allocation literature (such
as one-sided matching, hedonic games, etc) in that each
agent’s type is the amount of resources she brings, rather
than her preference over allocations. Our goal is to de-
sign strategy-proof mechanisms that achieve two objectives:
maxmin and Pareto efficiency.
Our framework is rich enough to encompass, or at least
heavily intersect with, a variety of applications, such as
cloud resource allocation [13, 24], facility location [26], fair
division [25] and network route allocation [this paper].
Main results
We make the following contributions.
1. Black-box reductions
For any resource allocation problem, we provide two
reductions, one for maxmin and the other for Pareto
efficiency, that automatically convert any optimal al-
gorithm into a strategy-proof mechanism that achieves
the same objective. Our reductions do not make use
of any algorithm but only assume black-box access to
the algorithm.
• For the maxmin objective, we construct a poly-
nomial time algorithm that, for any input, gener-
ates the optimal group-strategy-proof mechanism
by calling the optimal algorithm only once.
• For Pareto efficiency, we show that, if there is an
algorithm that serially optimizes the utility pro-
file, the algorithm per se is strategy-proof.
2. Application
Simple reductions as they may seem, their generalities
are demonstrated by a complex, practical application:
network route allocation.
Network route allocation. In this application, each
node downloads a file from a server node located some-
where in the network. It can download via a direct
route to the sever (it can do so without joining the
mechanism, imposing an IR constraints to the design
problem) or, by joining the mechanism, download via
certain indirect routes that pass through other nodes.
Each node has a certain private capacity (resource)
that specifies the maximum limit of flow that can pass
through it. Upon receiving the reports of private ca-
pacities, the mechanism returns a multi-commodity
flow on the network. Our model encompasses both
client-server networks and peer-to-peer networks [23,
Chapter 4]. Applying our reductions, one can obtain
IR and strategy-proof mechanisms that achieve either
maxmin or efficiency.
ar
X
iv
:1
50
3.
06
53
6v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  2
3 M
ar 
20
15
Related work
In the literature of mechanism design without money, a pop-
ular line of work concerns how to locate a facility [17, 26].
They study a mechanism design problem where agents are
located on the real line and the mechanism select the loca-
tion of a facility, where each agent’s cost is its distance to
the facility. The objectives are maxmin as well as efficiency.
They give tight bounds on ratio of the optimal strategy-
proof mechanism over the optimal algorithm without incen-
tive constraints. This line of work has been extended to a
number of variations, such as there are two facilities [15], or
the utility function is not linear [11], or the objective is the
least square [10].
Resource allocation is also of central importance to the
multiagent system community. It has been widely discussed
in the application of smart grid [28, 27] and has been of the
main application scenario of security games (see [30]).
Our resource allocation notion is related to the classic bi-
lateral trade setting [19], resource exchange setting [3], as
well as the recently coined reallocation settings [4]. A key
distinction is, as mentioned, our setting treats the amount
of contributed resources as private type while this amount
is public information in their settings and they all treat val-
uation functions as types. Furthermore, their objectives are
focused on characterization of efficient truthful mechanisms
while our objective is to reduce mechanism design to algo-
rithm design.
The second blackbox reduction in this paper, i.e., the one
for the Pareto efficiency objective, makes use of algorithms
that serially maximizes the utility profiles. This idea natu-
rally relates our reduction to the (randomly) serial dictator-
ship literature [29, 5, 16, 2], which are known to be strat-
egyproof and Pareto efficient. Note again that their strat-
egyproofness is defined with respect to truthful announce-
ment of preferences, rather than contributed resources. An-
other distinction is that the serial dictatorship literature is
concerned with allocation of indivisible items while our fo-
cus is on divisible resources. This distinction is not essential
though, if randomization are permitted.
2. THE RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROB-
LEM
We now formulate the resource allocation problem.
An environment specifies the parameters for the mecha-
nism designer to operate.
Definition 1. An environment is a tuple {N ,S,P,O, u},
where
• N denotes the set of n agents,
• S = S1 × S2 × · · · × Sn, where each Si is the private
type set of agent i,
• P is a set of public information and resources shared
by all agents,
• O is the set of outcomes.
By revelation principle [18], one can without loss restrict
attentions to the set of direct revelation mechanisms, which
can be regarded as functions that maps agents’ reported
type profile and public info. into an outcome.
Definition 2. Given an environment, a deterministic mech-
anism is a function M : S × P → O.
Each agent i in the environment comes with a private
amount of resources si ∈ Si and is asked by the mechanism
to report this quantity. Upon receiving all inputs, the mech-
anism returns an outcome, i.e., an allocation of resources.
For example, consider a variant of the dominant resource
problem defined in [13], Si = R+m where the j-th element in
the vector is the amount of j-th resource that agent i owns.
Agent i needs ci,1 units of the first type of resource and ci,2
units of the second and · · · ci,m units of the m-th in order to
conduct 1 unit of job task. Thus, P is the set of all possible
such {(ci,1, ci,2, · · · , ci,m)}nj=1 and O is the set of all possible
distributions of resources.
A resource allocation environment imposes certain feasi-
bility constraints on any mechanism defined on it. For ex-
ample, no mechanism shall allocate 3 CPU units to an agent
if there are only 2 units of CPU within the society.
Definition 3. For any mechanism input s1 ∈ S1, s2 ∈
S2, · · · , sn ∈ Sn, p ∈ P, define FEA(s1, s2, · · · , sn, p) ⊆ O
as a set of feasible outcomes under (s1, s2, · · · , sn, p).
Consider again the dominant resource problem, o ∈ FEA(
s1, · · · , sn, p) if and only if the resource allocation prescribed
by o is feasible1 under the input.
We consider environments and feasibility constraints that
satisfy the following resource monotone property.
Definition 4. For an environment {N ,S,P,O}, a feasibil-
ity constraint fuction FEA is resource monotone if ∀i, there
is a partial order ≤i on Si, such that given any input profile
s1, s2, · · · , sn and p ∈ P, for any s′i ≤ si, we have
FEA(s1, · · · , s′i, · · · , sn, p) ⊆ FEA(s1, · · · , si, · · · , sn, p).
Intuitively, resource monotonicity states that the larger
amount of resource one contributes, the larger is the set of
feasible allocations. For a mechanism defined on an envi-
ronment satisfying the resource monotonicity, we call it a
resource allocation mechanism.
Every player has a utility function ui : O×P → R. In this
paper, we consider a type of ui that must only be related
to public information and outcome. This means that the
agent’s utility does not depend on her private resources. In
addition, we assume that there exists an empty outcome o∗
that for any other outcome o, ui(o
∗, p) ≤ ui(o, p).
The above definition of utility is not uncommon in the
resource allocation domain. Consider again the dominant
resource problem, the number of total units of computation
player i can conduct only depends on the allocation out-
come o and her c-vector (ci,1, ci,2, · · · , ci,m) and the empty
outcome is the allocation where no one gets any resource.
The goal of resource allocation mechanism design is to
optimize a certain real-valued function w : O → R for equi-
librium outcomes. Here w can be different functions accord-
ing to different application scenarios. For example, in some
cases w denotes social welfare, i.e., w(o) =
∑n
i=1 ui(o, p);
while in some other cases, w denotes the minimum utility
among all agents’, i.e., w(o) = mini ui(o, p).
The solution concept in this paper is the dominant strat-
egy equilibrium.
1Feasibility means does not over-allocate any type of re-
source.
Definition 5. A mechanism is dominant-strategy truthful,
(aka. strategy-proof) if for any s1, · · · , sn, p and any s′i ≤i
si
2, then
ui (M(s1 · · · si, · · · sn, p), p) ≥ ui
(M(s1 · · · s′i · · · sn, p), p)
Definition 6. A mechanism is group strategy-proof if for
any s1, · · · , sn, p and any s′1, · · · , s′n where each s′i ≤i si,
then
ui (M(s1, · · · , sn, p), p) ≥ ui
(M(s′1, · · · , s′n, p), p)
It is easy to see that the definition above subsumes (is
stronger than) another definition of group strategyproofness
that no subset of agents could jointly deviate so that the
resulting outcome is better off for anyone in this subset.
Our goal in this paper is to provide a tool to design strategy-
proof mechanisms that optimize certain objectives. In par-
ticular, given an algorithm that optimizes a certain objec-
tive, we use this algorithm as a black-box and return a
strategy-proof mechanism that optimizes the same objec-
tive.
3. MAX-MIN
In this section, we consider the problem of designing a
strategy-proof mechanism that maximizes the minimal util-
ity among all agents, i.e., w(o) = mini∈N ui(o, p). We show
that, given an algorithm that computes the arg maxo w(o),
we can construct a strategy-proof mechanism with output
o′ such that w(o′) = w(o) for each input.
Definition 7. An environment is continuous if for any (s1,
· · · , sn, p), let ow = arg maxo w(o) and for any u′i ≤ ui(ow, p),
there must exist some outcome o′ ∈ FEA(s1, s2, · · · , si, · · · ,
sn, p) such that ui(o
′, p) = u′i and for any j 6= i, uj(o′, p) =
uj(ow, p).
Theorem 1. If there exists an algorithm A that opti-
mizes w(o) = mini ui(o, p) for some continuous, resource
monotone environment, one can efficiently construct a strategy-
proof mechanism M that optimizes w(o).
This theorem states that for the resource allocation prob-
lems under consideration, designing strategy-proof mecha-
nism with max-min objective is no harder than the corre-
sponding algorithm design problem.
We prove the following stronger theorem instead.
Theorem 2. If there exists an algorithm A that opti-
mizes w(o) = mini ui(o, p) for some continuous , resource
monotone environment, one can efficiently construct a group-
strategy-proof mechanism M that optimizes w(o).
Given an algorithm A, we can construct M as follows:
In other words, we find an outcome on that brings down
all agents’ utilities to u∗, the maxmin value computed by A.
Proof. First, let us analyze the time complexity of the
mechanism. Denote TIME(A) as the time complexity of
algorithm A and TIME(F ) as an upper bound of the time
complexity to find such new outcome. So the time complex-
ity is O (TIME(A) + nTIME(F )). The time of computing
2We assume throughout that agents never overreport. Over-
report can lead to infeasible allocations, which can be easily
detected and punished.
Mechanism 1 A group strategy-proof mechanism via A
1. on inputs s1, s2, · · · , sn, p, run A(s1, · · · , sn, p) to get
the outcome o0;
2. let u∗ ← mini ui(o0, p);
3. for i = 1, 2, · · · , n:
find oi such that for all j 6= i, uj(oi, p) =
uj(oi−1, p) and ui(oi, p) = u∗ ≤ ui(oi−1, p);
4. outputs on;
oi is often small enough, for example in our application, so
that M has time complexity O(TIME(A)).
Now we verify that M really outputs a feasible solution
which optimizes w(·). The outcome on is feasible because in
each step oi is feasible by the continuity of the environment.
Also, it is straightforward that w(on) = w(o0).
Finally, we prove that M is group-strategy-proof. Con-
sider any input s1, s2, · · · , sn, p and everyone reports s′i where
s′i ≤i si:
ui (M(s1, s2, · · · , si, · · · , sn, p), p)
= max
o∈FEA(s1,··· ,si,··· ,sn,p)
w(o)
≥ max
o∈FEA(s′1,s2,··· ,si,··· ,sn,p)
w(o)
...
≥ max
o∈FEA(s′1,s′2,··· ,s′i,··· ,s′n,p)
w(o)
= ui
(M(s′1, s′2, · · · , s′i, · · · , s′n, p), p)
SoM is a group-strategy-proof mechanism that optimizes
w(o).
Applying the same technique, one can produce a strategy-
proof mechanism to optimize w(o) = mini fi(ui(o, p)) with
n strictly increasing functions f1, f2, · · · , fn. With this ex-
tension, we can optimize some interesting objectives subject
to the individual rationality constraints. We now formally
define individual rationality.
4. MAX-MIN SUBJECT TO INDIVIDUAL RA-
TIONALITY
In this section, we consider the setting where if a player
does not join the mechanism, he will get a utility ri(p) that
only depends on the public information p. In the previous
setting, every player’s ri(p) = −∞; in other words, she al-
ways wants to join the mechanism in the previous setting.
Definition 8. A mechanism is individual rational if on any
inputs s1, s2, · · · , sn, p, the mechanism outputs o such that
for any i ∈ N , ui(o, p) ≥ ri(p).
4.1 Replacing ui by fi(ui)
So the problem now is to design a strategy-proof and in-
dividual rational mechanism that achieves certain objective.
This can be achieved by the same method as Theorem 1.
Theorem 3. If there exists an algorithm A that computes
w(o) = mini fi(ui(o, p)) for a continuous environment with
strictly increasing functions f1, f2, · · · , fn, one can construct
a strategy-proof mechanism M that computes w(o).
The reduction is identical to that in theorem 1 thus the
proof is omitted.
By this theorem, we can design individual rational and
strategy-proof mechanism that optimizes the following:
Corollary 1. Let fi(x) = x−ri(p), one obtains an indi-
vidual rational and strategy-proof mechanism that optimizes
the minimal utility gain fi.
Corollary 2. If ri(p) > 0 for any i ∈ N , let fi(x) =
x/ri(p), one obtains an individually rational and strategy-
proof mechanism that optimizes minimal increasing rate.
4.2 Optimizing mini ui(o, p) subject to IR
A further question is, can we optimize mini ui(o, p) instead
of w(o) = mini fi(ui(o, p)), subject to IR? We answer this
affirmatively by modifying the previous method to produce
an IR and SP mechanism that optimizes mini ui(o, p).
Theorem 4. If there exists an algorithm A that computes
w(o) = mini ui(o, p) for any continuous, resource monotone
environment, such that ui(o, p) ≥ ri(p), then we can con-
struct a strategy-proof and individual rational mechanismM
that computes w(o).
5. PARETO EFFICIENCY
In this section, we discuss the objective of implementing
a serially optimal outcome. We still use the same setting
except that we now restrict agent’s i type space Si to R.
Definition 9. An outcome o is called serially optimal un-
der s1, · · · , sn, p if the utility profile (u1(o, p), · · · , un(o, p))
is the lexicographically largest one among all possible utility
profiles; formally, for any o′ ∈ FEA(s1, · · · , sn, p), either the
utility profile of o equals to that of o′ or there exists some
j ∈ N such that for all k < j, uk(o, p) = uk(o′, p) and
uj(o, p) > uj(o
′, p).
Clearly, serial optimality implies Pareto efficiency, so we
focus on the former. Our problem now becomes, given any
list of input, compute a strategy-proof and serially optimal
outcome. Before we start, we need the following property.
Definition 10. The utility functions are monotone if for
any i ∈ N , any inputs s1, · · · , sn, p and 0 < δ ≤ ui(o, p) −
ri(p), there exists an ε > 0 such that for any 0 < ε
′ < ε,
there exists an outcome o′ ∈ FEA(s1, · · · , si− ε′, · · · , sn, p)
such that for any j 6= i, uj(o′, p) = uj(o, p) and ui(o′, p) ≥
ui(o, p)− δ.
Theorem 5. If there exists an algorithm A that serially
optimizes w(o) = (u1(o, p), u2(o, p), · · · , un(o, p)) for mono-
tone utility functions, resource monotone environment and
ui(o, p) ≥ ri(p), and for each player i, her utility, which is a
function of si, ui (A(s1 . . . si . . . sn, p), p) is continuous, the
algorithm itself is an IR and SP mechanism that computes
a serially optimal outcome.
Proof. We denote xi(ε) = ui (A(s1, · · · , si − ε, · · · , sn, p), p)
for 0 ≤ ε ≤ si, for fixed inputs s1, · · · , sn, p (we call it (1)).
ε∗
ε
g(ε)
Figure 1: A figure for our proof
xi(ε) is a continuous function of si. First we prove that
there exists an ε > 0, A outputs an outcome o′ such that
ui(o
′, p) ≤ ui(o, p) under s1, · · · , si− ε′, · · · , sn, p (we call it
(2)) for any 0 < ε′ ≤ ε.
We prove it by contradiction. An important observation is
that any feasible solution under (2) is also feasible under (1)
by the resource monotone environment condition, in other
words,
FEA(s1, · · · , si−ε′, · · · , sn, p) ⊆ FEA(s1, · · · , si, · · · , sn, p).
If (uj(o
′, p))nj=1 has the property that ui(o
′, p) > ui(o, p),
then there must exist k < i such that uj(o
′, p) = uj(o, p)
for all j < k and uk(o
′, p) < uk(o, p) (because a solution
in (2) is a solution in (1) and (uj(o, p))
n
j=1 is the serially
optimal). However we can construct a larger solution for (2):
by the monotone utility function condition, we know that
there exists an outcome o′′ such that uj(o′′, p) = uj(o, p) for
all j 6= i and uj(o′′, p) > ui(o, p)− δ for some δ and ε which
is a contradiction that the algorithm find a serially optimal
solution.
Next we prove that ui(ε) is a decreasing function. Let
gi(ε) = xi(ε)− ri(p). Because the algorithm is IR, gi(ε) ≥ 0
for all feasible ε. For any ε such that gi(ε) > 0, there exists
an δ > 0 such that gi(ε) ≥ gi(ε′) for any ε ≤ ε′ ≤ ε+ δ (by
the monotone utility function) so it is locally monotonically
decreasing. When gi(ε) = 0, for all feasible ε
′ > ε, gi(ε′) =
0. If gi(ε
′) > 0, we can find a first extreme point ε∗ ∈ (ε, ε′].
Then for any small δ > 0, g(ε∗ − δ) < gi(ε∗) which conflicts
with the utility function monotone.
So gi(ε) is a monotonically decreasing function when gi(ε) >
0. And if gi(ε
∗) = 0, then gi(′) for ′ > ∗ will always be 0
. We can conclude that gi(·) is a monotonically decreasing
function. Since xi(·) = gi(·) + ri(p), xi(·) is also a monoton-
ically decreasing function which means player i will never
get more profit by reporting a lower s′i ≤ si.
The theorem states that for monotone utility functions and
resource environment, mechanism design is as easy as algo-
rithm design.
Serial optimization by contribution
In order to do serial optimization, one needs to pre-specify
a (static) ordering on N , resulting in unfairness for agents
who have low rank. In this section, we show that, without
sacrificing strategyproofness, this ordering can be extended
to depend on the input. In particular, this ordering can
be consistent with the ranking of agents’ contributions: the
more one contributes, the higher priority she gets.
Formally, define “order envy-freeness” as follows:
Definition 11. Consider the class of serially optimized mech-
anisms, a mechanism is order envy-free (OEF) with respect
to {li}ni=1 (li is a weight for agent i) if for any two agents
i, j ∈ N , such that lisi > ljsj , i is ranked before j in the
serial ordering.
Order envy-freeness states that an agent gets a higher
priority for optimization than the ones with lower contribu-
tions. In particular, if set li = 1 ∀i, the order of optimization
is same as the ranking on reports.
Theorem 6. If there exists an algorithm A that serially
optimizes w(o, q) = (uq1(o, p), uq2(o, p), · · · , uqn(o, p)) ( where
q is an index on agents such that lqisqi ≥ lqj sqj for any
i < j) for monotone utility functions, resource monotone
environment and ui(o, p) ≥ ri(p), then the algorithm itself
is an IR, SP and OEF (w.r.t {lj}nj=1) mechanism that com-
pute a serially optimal outcome.
To achieve order envy-freeness, we define a slightly dif-
ferent reduction as follows. Given reported {si}, we gener-
ate an ordering qi such that for any i, lqisqi > lqi+1sqi+1
and optimizes each xi according to the order {qi}. In other
words, we define the order according to their contributions:
the more you share, the earlier you get served. Technically
speaking, this modified mechanism does not belong to the
class of mechanisms we have proposed since the ordering of
optimization now explicitly depends on the report. However,
it is easy to check that this modification does not affect IR,
PE, SP and guarantee OEF as a plus. The mechanism is
listed below. The proof follows a similar argument to the
static case, which we do not repeat.
Mechanism 2 An IR, SP, PE and OEF mechanism
1. on inputs s1, s2, · · · , sn, p, and l1, · · · , ln,
2. compute the order qi by any sorting algorithm,
3. run A(sq1 , · · · , sqn , p, q) to get the outcome o;
4. output o
6. APPLICATION: NETWORK ROUTE AL-
LOCATION
Starting from this section, we show the generality of our
methodology by applying it to two realistic scenarios. The
two applications are highly nontrivial and valuable on their
own rights.
We first consider an interesting route allocation problem
in multiple-commodity networks. For the network struc-
tures under consideration, there are several vertices known
as users. Each user demands a file of certain size stored on
a server. The users form a directed graph. Each user has a
capacity, which denotes the maximum (traffic) flow that can
go through that vertex. We assume this vertex capacity is
private information of the user. Between each user and each
server, there is an arc constrained by certain capacity, de-
noting the maximal flow that can go through the arc. Given
such a network, a user can download her target file via any
route to the destination server3. Given the reported vertex
capacities, a route allocation mechanism allocates a route
(or multiple routes, both of which we consider) and feasible
flow within the route for each user.
It is not hard to see that our formulation encompasses
route allocation problems in both client-server based and
peer-to-peer based (simply treat a server in our model as a
peer that never downloads) networks. In practice, the same
route allocation problem has been witnessed by Xun-You
Inc.4, an online gaming platform that aims to resolve the
congestions on networks consisting of subnetworks by mul-
tiple Internet Service Providers. The same problems have
also been witnessed by route optimization among multiple
express companies, each of which specializes in some geo-
graphic region.
A user’s utility is the negation of its time delay, given by
− file size
allocated flow
.
This notion of utility is widely used in the evaluation of per-
formance in a network system or an operating system. More
importantly, it does not depend on the private information
of users, i.e., the private capacity of each vertex, allowing
our framework to be applicable.
We will use the above reduction theorems to design a
strategy-proof mechanism that achieves the minmax objec-
tive (see [20]), i.e., to minimize the maximum delay among
all users. We also consider the objective of Pareto efficiency.
6.1 Setting
Formally, in our setting, there are n users P = {p1, p2, · · · ,
pn} and m servers Q = {q1, q2, · · · , qm} (pi is called user i
and qj is called server j). For a user pi, her desired file is
stored on server di, i.e, qdi . The size of the file is ci units.
If the amount of her available bandwidth5 is x (x units of
flow per second), she can finish her task in ci/x.
The connections between users form a directed graph G =
(V,E), where V is the set of vertex in the graph, E is the set
of edges. For a vertex in V , it denotes a user in P . A pair of
users can connect with each other. For an edge 〈u, v〉 ∈ E,
we assume there is not limitation in the edge 〈u, v〉, in other
words, arbitrarily large flow can pass through this edge. This
is with out loss of generality — all results carry over to the
setting where each edge has a capacity.
Also, each user pi can connect to a subset of servers. For
a pair of user pi and server qj , there is an edge between
them with bandwidth bi,j . That is, this edge can transmit
at most bi,j units of flow per second. When bi,j = 0, there
is no connection between pi and qj .
Each user has a bandwidth limitation locally. The total
amount of flow she can download and share with others per
second is at most vi. In reality, vi is the limitation that
3For each user, there exists a direct route via which the user
can down its file without even join the mechanism. By join-
ing the mechanism, however, the user can download the file
via any indirect route that pass through other uses who also
join the mechanism by sharing their bandwidths. This out-
side option imposes an IR constraint for the design problem.
4http://www.xunyou.com/
5We use “bandwidth” and “flow” interchangeably.
q1
q2
p1
p2
p3
Figure 2: A sample model, d1 = d2 = 1, d3 = 2
can depend on user i’s hardware or software. A user pi can
download her own file either by the edge directly between pi
and qdi or indirectly from some pj ’s where pj downloads it
from the edge pj and qdi .
Consider the illustrating example in Figure 2. The left
nodes are users and the right nodes are servers. The solid
lines denote connections between users and dashed lines de-
note connections between users and servers. In this exam-
ple, user p3 could download its file through the edge 〈p3, q2〉,
through the path 〈p3, p1〉, 〈p1, q2〉 or the path 〈p3, p1〉, 〈p1, p2〉,
〈p2, q2〉.
We assume that G, {bi,j} i=1...n
j=1···m
, {(di, ci)}i=1···n are pub-
lic information that is shared by all users and the mechanism
designer, while {vi}ni=1 is private information known only
to each user i. Given a reported profile of (v1, v2, · · · , vn),
a mechanism returns a flow assignment xi for each i (a
multiple-route assignment).
Thus, we can define the environment {N ,S,P,O, u} of
this problem:
• N denotes the set of n agents,
• S = S1 × S2 × · · · Sn each Si = R represents the local
bandwidth limitation vi,
• P represents servers Q, the whole graph structures
G = (V,E), {(di, ci)}i=1···n and all information about
capacities on edges,
• O is the set of all the possible assignments,
• ui(o, p) = − cixi where xi is i’s total amount of flow in
the assignment o.
Also we need to define individual rationality ri(·): for any
agent i ∈ N , the flow she receives by a mechanism is greater
than or equal to her direct route bandwidth bi,di if she does
not join the mechanism. Formally, ri(p) = bi,di .
6.2 Max-Min objective subject to individual
rationality
Lemma 1. The above environment is resource monotone
and continuous.
Proof. For any feasible assignment in FEA(s1, s2, · · · , sn, p),
it doesn’t violate any constraint in FEA(s1, · · · , si+ε, · · · , sn, p),
implying monotonicity.
For any u′i ≤ ui, we can simply decrease xi to x′i =
−ci/u′i ≤ −ci/ui = xi by cancelling xi − x′i units of flow
in the assignment. So it is continuous.
By theorem 4, we only need to give an algorithm to opti-
mize mini ui(o). Because the multiple-commodity flow prob-
lem can be written in linear program, so we can get the
algorithm by binary search and linear programming:
Mechanism 3 An algorithm to minimize the maximal cost
binary search D ∈
[
0,maxi∈N cibi,di
]
, if the following
LP is feasible under certain D, decrease D; otherwise,
increase D :
maximize : 0 (No objective here, i.e., a linear-
feasibility program.)
subject to
1. xi = xi,1+xi,2+ · · ·+xi,n for all i = 1, · · · , n;
2. xi = xi,i +
∑
e′ fi,e′ (e
′ going into i) for all
i = 1, · · · , n;
3.
∑
e′′ fi,e′′ =
∑
e′ fi,e′ + xi,j (e
′ going into j
and e′′ going out of j) for all i 6= j;
4. xi ≥ bi,di for all i;
5. xi ≥ ci/D for all i
6. Σjxj,i +
∑
e′,j fj,e′ ≤ vi (e′ going into of i) ;
7.
∑
k xk,i ≤ bi,j (where k have the following
property: dk = j), for all i, j;
8. all variables are non-negative.
1. In the first equations, xi denotes the final flow user i
can get, and xi,k denotes the flow user i gets from the
edge 〈pk, qdi〉. xi,i is the flow on the direct edge from
the user i to the server.
2. Let fi,e denote the final flow in edge e when transport-
ing the file ci between di and pdi . So, for the second
equation, xi is the sum of all fi,e′ (ingoing flow) and
xi,i.
3. The third one shows that in each vertex, the total ingo-
ing flow equals the total outgoing flow, which is known
as the “flow conservation” constraints. Note that when
i = j, the equation does not make sense, since it is
impossible for user i to transport her target flow to
others.
4. The fourth constraints ensures individual rationality.
5. The fifth means the upper bound of time each user
needs is at most D.
6. The sixth inequalities
∑
j xj,i+
∑
e′,j fj,e′ ≤ vi are the
‘capacity constraints’ on vertices.
7. The sixth inequalities
∑
k xk,i ≤ bi,j are the ‘capacity
constraints’ on edges.
8. The final constraints ensures all variables being non-
negative.
With Algorithm 6.2, we obtain a SP, IR and Maxmin
mechanism (Algorithm 6.2) by theorem 4:
Mechanism 4 A strategy-proof minmax Mechanism
1. Binary search the minimized maximal downloading
time D∗ among the solution of the LP (listed above)
2. For all pi ∈ P
(a) if ci
bidi
< D, set x′i ← bidi
(b) else set x′i ← ciD
3. For all pi ∈ P , add constraint xi = x′i
4. Solve the new LP to compute the assignment.
6.3 Pareto efficiency subject to individual ra-
tionality
By theorem 5, we know that if there exists an algorithm
to find a serially optimal outcome o for monotone utility
function, resource monotone environment and IR, it is a
strategy-proof mechanism. Algorithm 6.3 gives the outcome
we want. Almost all constraints are the same as what we
listed in the previous section except that the seventh con-
straint ensures that the final solution (u1(o, p), · · · , un(o, p))
is the serially optimal one among all the outcomes.
Mechanism 5 An IR, PE and SP mechanism
Given G, {bi,j}, {(di, ci)}, {vi}, repeat the following proce-
dure n = |V | times:
maximize : xi (the i-th time)
subject to
1. xi = xi,1 + xi,2 + · · ·+ xi,n for all i = 1, · · · , n;
2. xi = xi,i +
∑
e′ fi,e′ (e
′ going into i) for all i =
1, · · · , n;
3.
∑
e′′ fi,e′′ =
∑
e′ fi,e′ + xi,j (e
′ going into j and
e′′ going out of j) for all i 6= j;
4. xi ≥ bi,di for all i;
5.
∑
j xj,i +
∑
e′,j fj,e′ ≤ vi (e′ going into i) ;
6.
∑
k xk,i ≤ bi,j (where k have the following prop-
erty: dk = j), for all i, j;
7. for all j ≤ i − 1, set xi = x∗i where x∗i ’s are the
xi’s optimized so far;
8. all variables are non-negative;
We have already checked the resource monotone condi-
tion and still need to check whether the utility function is
monotone.
Lemma 2. {ui}ni=1 are monotone utility functions under
the environment.
To prove the lemma 2, we need to prove the following
lemma.
Lemma 3. For any possible IR solution {x1, x2, · · · , xn},
{xi,j}, {fi,e}, there exists an IR solution {x1, · · · , xn}, {x′i,j},
{f ′i,e} with x′i,i = bi,di .
The lemma states that, it is without loss of generality
to restrict to allocations where each user exhausts all its
bandwidth.
Proof. First we prove that all bandwidth in 〈i, di〉 will
always be used in some solution. Because of the inequalities
xi ≥ bi,di , the final bandwidth xi is at least bi,di . If the
bandwidth in the edge 〈pi, qdi〉 is not fully exhausted (let b′
be the remaining bandwidth in that edge), we can remove
bi,di − b′ bandwidth from other paths and add it into the
edge 〈i, di〉. This operation does not violate any constraint.
So we can repeat this operation and finally all 〈i, di〉 is fully
exhausted.
After having such a solution, we can modify some flow
assignment so that all bandwidth in 〈i, di〉 will always be
used by i in some solutions. Now every edge 〈pi, qdi〉 is fully
used, we can use exchange techniques to let 〈pi, qdi〉 is only
used by i. If part of 〈pi, qdi〉 is used by other user j, there
must be a path from pi to pk and then from pk to qdi with
bandwidth ε. We can give this path to user j (attached
to the path from pj to pi) and give ε units bandwidth in
〈pi, qdi〉 to pi. Repeating this operations, we finally let all
bandwidth in 〈pi, qdi〉 be used only by user i.
We now prove that the utility functions are monotone:
Proof. For any i ∈ N and any inputs s1, · · · , sn, p, i
will get ui(o, p) = − cixi from the best outcome o. For any
0 < δ ≤ − ci
xi
+ ci
bi,di
, we can construct an outcome o′
with utility profile {u1(o, p), · · · , ui(o, p) − δ, · · · , un(o, p)}
from a solution for o. A simple observation is that x′i =−ci
ui(o,p)−δ . So one straightforward method is to decrease xi
to x′i. Let ε = xi − x′i. Because of lemma 3, there is a so-
lution {xj,k}, {fj,e} to get the same utility profile of o such
that xj,j = bj,dj and
∑n
k=1 xj,k = xj for all j. Now we
construct the following outcome o′:
• x′i,i = xi,i − ε, and for other x′j,k = xj,k;
• x′i = xi − ε, and for other x′j = xj ;
• f ′j,e = fj,e for all possible j, e;
Now we check whether the solution violates any constraint.
For the first two inequalities, they still hold. For the third
and sixth one, they aren’t related to any new variables so
it still holds. Because 0 < δ ≤ − ci
xi
+ ci
bi,di
, we find that
x′i =
−ci
ui(o,p)−δ ≥ bi,di .
For the fifth one,∑
j
x′i,j +
∑
e′,j
f ′j,e′ = x
′
i,i +
∑
j 6=i
x′i,j +
∑
e′,j
f ′j,e′
= xi,i − ε+
∑
j 6=i
xi,j +
∑
e′,j
fj,e′
≤ vi − ε = v′i
Then, we will show that x1(·), · · · , xn(·) is continuous
functions of variable ε. We can use the following lemma [1]:
for the function x1(ε), there exists a closed interval [α, β],
such that the LP is infeasible for all ε 6∈ [α, β]; and in the
interval [α, β], x1(ε) ⊆ R and it is a continuous convex piece-
wise linear function. So for x1(·), it is a continuous function.
Now using induction, if we have proven that x1(·), · · · , xk(·)
is continuous functions, then xk+1(ε) = xk+1(ε, x1(ε), · · · ,
xk(ε)). Using the theorem about multiparametric linear pro-
gramming [12], we know that xk+1 is a continuous function
over {ε, x1, · · · , xk}. Also because xi(·) is a continuous func-
tion of ε, it is easy to verify xk+1(·) is a continuous function
of ε according to the definition.
All the constraints hold. So these utility functions are
monotone.
Lemma 2 implies algorithm 6.3 is strategy-proof.
In addition, we can obtain order envy-freeness by sorting
agents according to weights {lj} and types {sj} and opti-
mizing them one by one. This is quite straightforward by
theorem 6;
To conclude the section, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 7. There exists an IR and SP mechanism which
minimizes maximal cost/delay and an IR, OEF and SP mech-
anisms which gives a Pareto efficient solution for the route
allocation problem.
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTHER WORK
In this paper, we studied truthful mechanism design for a
general class of resource allocation settings, where the cen-
ter redistributes the private resources brought by individ-
uals. We designed truthful mechanisms that achieve two
objectives: maxmin and Pareto efficiency. For each objec-
tive, we provided a reduction that converts any optimal al-
gorithm into a strategy-proof mechanism that achieves the
same objective. Applying the reductions, one can system-
atically produce strategy-proof mechanisms in a non-trivial
application: network route allocation.
There are a number of exciting research directions to ex-
tend this work. First of all, the mechanism for the maxmin
objective is wasteful in the sense that all the players are
brought down to a utility level that equals the maxmin.
Is there another strategy proof mechanism that achieves
maxmin but yields better social welfare? Second, one can
consider the same set of objectives under more general set-
tings where randomization is allowed. Last but not least,
we are also interested in finding more applications to our
general algorithmic mechanism design framework.
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